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On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to forward to you a document on conflicts in the Great Lakes region by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda (see annex).

In view of the importance of the current debate on African issues in the Security Council this month, the document provides the necessary background to some of the root causes of the conflicts in the region. My Government requests that the document be circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) SEMAKULA KIWANUKA
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Annex

Conflicts in the Great Lakes region

by

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,
President of the Republic of Uganda

(24 January 2000)

The Great Lakes region's crisis most prominent features have been:

(i) Genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo;

(ii) Mass murders in Uganda (800,000 people were killed extrajudicially during the time of Amin and Obote);

(iii) Terrorism sponsored by the so-called Islamic regime of the Sudan with some collaboration from Afghanistan and some elements in Pakistan;

(iv) The absence of democratic governance for very long periods plus lack of proper state structures to guarantee this democracy.

General background:

The above manifestations of the Great Lakes region's problems are against the general background of the socio-economic, as well as political distortions, at the sunset of colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa. Maybe, let me start with these socio-economic and political distortions that characterized sub-Saharan Africa at the close of the colonial era. Although I have described the social-economic structure of the Ugandan society (as an example), at the dawn of colonialism, in 1860, elsewhere, I do not mind repeating it for the purposes of this debate. Many of the tribes in Uganda and the neighbouring territories of Eastern Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and North Western Tanzania had, by that time, become three-class societies comprising: the feudal class; the artisan class (blacksmiths, carpenters, potters, leather-workers, etc.); and the peasants (cultivators and cattle-keepers). Therefore, the African societies of our area were only one step away from, endogenously, entering the industrial phase of social metamorphosis. Without the negative exogenous interruption by colonialism, the artisan class would have evolved into the middle and working classes. With the onset of colonialism, however, our area suffered a massive social regression. The feudal class was eliminated because it was competing for political authority with colonialism; and the artisan class was greatly undermined by the massive, enforced imports of consumer and capital goods from Europe (hoes, pangas, ceramics, textiles, leather goods, etc.). Certainly in the case of Uganda, society became a one-class society thereafter - the peasantry. The colonial system developed a thin layer of colonial auxiliaries in the form of: sub-administrators, clerks, low-level teachers, non-commissioner officers and privates in the colonial Armies, interpreters, etc., from among the locals. They were, however, divorced from production of wealth and had no multiplier effect on the rest of society except, as I will point out later, in the post-colonial period.

This phenomenon of social regression, therefore, meant that, while the European society was metamorphosing from a feudal mode of production to an industrial bourgeois one, Africa was retreating from the feudal level to the pre-feudal. The failure to develop a bourgeois class, which is cosmopolitan-minded by virtue of its mode of production, has got implications for politics and the economy. The peasant class that came to be dominant in society is by nature parochial, unlike the middle class. Somebody who is looking after only goats does not need the whole of Uganda to do so. He is, therefore, mainly worried about the hills around him and the valleys that contain water so as to

feed and water his goats. Yes, some cash crops (coffee, cocoa and cotton) were exploited semi-commercially. These, however, had no internal linkages with the national economy and society. The peasants' cash crops were to feed European industries. This absence of internal economic linkages could not foster a national consciousness; and the national consciousness that the feudal classes had fostered was also being undermined. Where the minerals existed, they were also exploited in a manner that did not link them with the national economy other than providing the labour force. The predominance of a parochial ideology, concomitant to the domination of society by the peasantry, accentuated by the colonial schemes of divide and rule in order to forestall any possible anti-colonial rebellions, form an important background to all the problems of the Great Lakes region.

Owing to the worldwide anti-colonial movement (in India, China, Indo-China, Kenya, etc.), and also owing to the two inter-imperialist wars of the last century (1900s), it became impossible for the colonial Powers to maintain servitude over the colonized peoples. The colonialists that were far-sighted gave "independence" to the former colonies. Harold Macmillan of UK spoke of the unstoppable "wind of change" that was blowing across Africa in his Cape Town speech of 1960. Who, then, received this "independence"? It was, mainly, the former colonial auxiliaries (the colonial schoolteachers, the clerks, the colonial sergeants, etc.). Therefore, "independence" meant the continuation of the colonial state after decapitating it by removing its European brains and leaving the auxiliary body of low African colonial servants, many of whom were not prepared for such roles. That is how sergeant Idi Amin of the 4th Kings' African Rifles (KAR) (a British colonial outfit) became "Field marshal" Amin. This is the monster that killed 500,000 Ugandans. He was assisted by Obote who murdered 300,000 other Ugandans. Obote had been a trade union official for a little while and, later on, was in the colonial "Parliament" that had been hastily organized around 1958 (just four years before "independence").

This was an unfortunate cocktail. A society that had regressed to the pre-feudal era being presided over by colonial auxiliaries that had been hastily cast in the mode of freedom fighters, statesmen or field marshals. The society was excessively parochial and the latter were hopelessly out of their depth so that they could not diagnose the sickness of this society. These two phenomena form an important background in understanding the trauma of this region. You could erase the name of "Field Marshal" Idi Amin and you insert the name of "Field marshal" Mobutu Ssesse Sseko, Bokasa, Michombero, etc., etc.

On top of this general background, now add the mismanagement of Rwanda and Burundi by the Belgian colonial authorities. I have, in recent times, met very nice Belgian people. The Belgian colonial polices, however, were a very dangerous addition to the unfortunate background I have just outlined. While all the colonial countries used the tactics of divide and rule, the Belgian officials in charge of Rwanda went one dangerous step further: to incite and assist one of the sections of the Rwanda society to try and exterminate the other part. This happened in 1959. I normally hear outside commentators talking about the "ethnic" conflicts of Rwanda and Burundi. I would like to ask one question: Did these "ethnic" groups of Rwanda and Burundi only come into existence after the onset of Belgian colonialism? The answer is obviously, no.

Why do we, then, not hear of earlier "ethnic" conflicts in these countries? Why don't we hear of genocide before the colonial era?

I do not want to talk of the detailed situations of Rwanda and Burundi because there are those more competent to speak about those countries. I can, however, authoritatively speak about Uganda. Almost the whole of Western Uganda had comparable social formations just like the ones of Rwanda, Burundi, some parts of Eastern Congo and North Western Tanzania.

In order to do justice to this highly muddled up situation, I will integrate my earlier contribution on this subject with this presentation. Some months ago I gave a speech in Arusha on the issue of Burundi which I would like to reproduce here because it is important that the international community understands our highly complicated area which some intruders have really messed up. That speech went roughly as follows:

The Pre-Colonial Conflicts:

At the beginning of A.D. 1500, conflicts in Central Africa were characterized, in the main, by tribal raids for cattle and women rather than by wars of conquest. There were some efforts of Empire-building in the Great Lakes areas (the Bacwezi-Batembuzi-Babito kingdoms). The durability of such political entities was, however, compromised by poor mobility of the centralized authorities because of lack of the horse on account of tsetse flies, and small populations due to the diseases that thrived in the tropics. Small populations meant that there was no pressure on natural resources. Ours, until recently, was characterized by plentiful natural resources around small populations. There was, therefore, no need for one tribe to conquer another tribe and control it. The tribes did not have the reasons or the ability to engage in sustained expansionism in order to form large supranational states compared to the Russian or Chinese empires, for instance. In spite of the tribes being homogeneous culturally, they were not governed under unified kingdoms.

With small populations and poor mobility, the ability to sustain large-scale political units was impaired. Hence, many of the conflicts were raids for cattle, women and even slaves (abahuuku) and maids (abazaana). The raid by Ntare V of Ankole in around 1894 into Rwanda and the counter-raid by Kigeri IV, Rwabugiri, of Rwanda into Ankole in the same year fell into this category. The raid by Bachwa, son of Mutambuka, into Makara (Congo) in around 1860, again, falls into this category. In that raid, for instance, a young girl known as Kibooga was captured as a maid (a muzaana). Since she was beautiful, she was eventually, married by Mutambuka, the King of Ankole. She produced Ntare V, Rugingiza, who became the King of Ankole until his death in 1895.

In some areas of Central Africa, we also had wars of succession. In this respect, I can quote again the wars between Ntare and his half-brothers, Mukwenda and Muhikira and the one between Kabalega and Kabigumiire of Bunyoro in the year 1871. At this point, I would like to quote the exemplary case of Buganda where succession wars were banished after the one between Jjunju and Semakokiro in 1771. The Baganda clan leaders, 52 of them, decided that, thereafter, the upbringing of the Princes would no longer be the responsibility of the Kabaka (the King) or of their mothers. It would, instead, be the

responsibility of a designated state official, Kasujju of the Ngeye clan. He would be the mukuza (guardian) of all the princes. In order to ensure that none of the princes would be a rallying point for faction formation, all princes were confined by Kasujju in the amphitheatre (olunnya) in Katereke in Mpigi. Everything they needed was provided for them there. However, the princes paid for this through isolation from all the members of the public, including their mothers. They would only deal with Kasujju, their wives and pages.

When the Kabaka died, he would not indicate a successor. He would depart in peace. Then the Council of Clan Leaders would meet and they would ask Kasujju to "present his children" - the Princes (okwanjula abaana be). Kasujju would go through the qualities of the Princes: This one is "kind"; that one is "cruel" (mukambwe); the other one is lazy (munafu) etc. The clans' council would, then, make a decision by voting. The day after, the public would be assembled and the job of announcing the king would be done by another state official, Mugema of the Nkima clan. Mugema, however, would have to invoke the authority of God (Lubaale) in order to have the nominee of the Clan's Council accepted by the public. To the public it had to appear that the king had been nominated by Lubaale (God) and not merely by the Clan's Council, reverence to the Clan's Council notwithstanding.

Hence, all the princes would be lined up in full view of the public. Mugema would, then, move up and down the line waiting for Lubaale (God) to indicate to him which of the princes was suitable to be king. After several laps of moving up and down, Lubaale would guide Mugema to the Prince that had been agreed upon by the Clan's Council the previous day. Such Lubaale-guided king-hunts were not without their drama and tragedies. It is said that when Kabaka Suuna died in 1854, the clan leaders' council, as the tradition had been established, conclaved to elect a new king. During the conclave of the previous day, they had agreed on a certain name. Some of the clan leaders departed. Those who remained, however, developed second thoughts about the name they had agreed on and, instead they settled on Mukaabya, Mutesa I. They must have been the majority.

When Mugema, therefore, guided by Lubaale, settled on the later nominee, Mutesa I, the ones who had departed early the previous day protested loudly that it was the other one and not Mutesa. Mugema ignored the protests and went ahead with the enthronement; but Mutesa had noted those chiefs that had protested. Once on the throne, he ensured that they were all put to death; hence, the name of Mukaabya (one who makes people weep).

Therefore, in the Great Lakes area, we have both examples of untamed succession wars as in the case of Ankole, Bunyoro and Rwanda by the 1800s; and a completely disciplined succession mechanism as in the case of Buganda. It is, therefore, important for us to note that the Baganda had successfully banished wars of succession from their system, ever since the 1771 war between Semakokiro and Jjunju. Succession wars were reintroduced by the British in late 1880s by disrupting this succession mechanism in an attempt to have monarchs loyal to them as many of the princes were repelled by the idea of a quisling King, subservient to foreign interests.

The other source of conflict was due to population migrations. Around 1500 and after, there were conflicts when the Luo peoples were moving into Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania from Southern Sudan. These, however, died down and the newcomers were either assimilated or they became good neighbours.

Contacts with the outside world:

The most destructive conflicts were those caused by the slave trade. Even slave trading empires or spheres of influence grew out of European guns fuelling conquest in order to get slaves. We have the examples of Lunda-Luba Empire and of the exploits of Tipu Tipu in Katanga. In terms of human haemorrhage, this was most destructive. René Dumont, in his False Start in Africa, estimates that as many as 50 million Africans perished in slavery.

Therefore, of all the pre-colonial African conflicts, the most destructive were the slave wars. The others were occasional and short-lived disturbances. Even the Shaka and Ngoni wars seem to have been sparked off by the arrival of the Whites at the Cape. The Zulu clans, which had hitherto not been centralized, woke up to the need of centralization in order to confront the Whites who started colonizing the Cape in 1652. As is well known, there was an upsurge of migration and conflict sparked off by these efforts of building a Centralized State out of a fraternity of independent kin clans of the Xhosa - Zulu-speaking peoples of southern Africa.

I, therefore, reiterate that the African conflicts of the pre-colonial times were rather benign and short-lived. In most of them, there was no record of genocide. It was mainly to capture cattle and women. Women were not killed but married. As far as the men were concerned, it would, probably, be the conquered chiefs that would be killed but not the ordinary people. Mutambuka caused the killing of the King of Karagwe, possibly Ndagara; but there was no killing of any significant number of Banyambo. Mutambuka, again, caused the killing of Ishansa of Kooki; but there was no significant number of ordinary Bakooki killed. Therefore, these purely African pre-colonial conflicts were short-lived raids, punitive expeditions or succession wars with either economic (cattle raids) or political (succession wars) motives.

What, then, characterizes colonial-fuelled African conflicts? We have seen that before the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference, two types of wars were engineered among Africans by the imperialists: The slave trade wars and the Ngoni wars which, I think, were precipitated by the arrival of the colonialists at the Cape as I pointed out above. Then there were the wars of resistance against colonialism after the Berlin Conference. In a period of almost 400 years (from 1498 to 1880), the European invaders slowly nibbled at the independence of Africa from their coastal trading and slaving stations: Zanzibar, Sofala, Mombasa, Luanda, Lagos, Cotonou, Gorée Island, etc. In 1498, when Vasco Da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, the Europeans did not have the strength to conquer the continent: No steam engine; no breech-loaders but muzzle loaders; and no automatic rifles; no quinine, etc. They therefore, stayed at the coast and relied on Black-on-Black wars to get what they needed: slaves, ivory, gold, etc.

By 1880, they had, through technological improvement, overcome their constraints. As the invaders were resolving their constraints, the Africans, through the greed of the African chiefs, were engaged in fratricidal conflicts on behalf of the foreign slavers. As an example, the kingdom of the Bakongo had been destroyed. Some of the successor kingdoms were to implement the slave trade and not to stop it. In spite of the improved technology of the whites and in spite of the myopia and greed of the African chiefs, many African peoples put up resistance: The Hehe, the Kalenjin, the Banyoro, the Shona, the Ndebele, the Somalis, the Herero, the Zulus, the Ashanti, etc. Since the African continent was divided politically, this resistance was piecemeal and was defeated one by one. The Ethiopians, however, defeated the Italians, completely, in 1896.

Wars of National Liberation:

One other type of conflict was the Wars of national Liberation. While much of the decolonization in Africa was peaceful, many of the colonial powers, having drawn appropriate lessons from the anti-colonial wars in China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, the massive independence movement in India, Kenya and Algeria, gave independence to their colonial possessions; a few were, however, foolish enough to ignore this "Wind of Change". Among the few were the Portuguese, the Settler Regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the racist Whites in South Africa and Namibia. These wars were legitimate and cleansing. They had solidarity from the whole of progressive Africa and from the Socialist camp. They resulted in the independence of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Namibia and majority rule in South Africa. They were laudable, principled and necessary; and they propelled Africa to a higher level of freedom.

Colonial Manipulation:

To go back to the colonization of Africa, we should point out that after conquest, the Europeans had to rely on manipulation: divide and rule in order to maintain their control. In Uganda they pitted Baganda against other Ugandans; Catholics versus Protestants; Christians against Moslems; Nilotics against Bantu, etc. In Rwanda and Burundi they promoted Hutu-Tutsi conflict; in Angola suspicion between the Mbundus and Ovimbundu; in Mozambique suspicions between Makua and others or trying to isolate the Makonde, etc.

These rivalries have resulted in open conflicts in many areas: Biafra versus Nigeria; Angola; violence in Kwazulu; violence in Matebele land; succession wars, religious wars and in more recent times, after colonialism, civil wars as far as Uganda is concerned; the conflict in Angola; the conflicts and genocide in Rwanda; the conflicts and genocide in Burundi, etc. The primary interest these rivalries, conflicts or genocide serve is colonial interest. The ways the conflicts are executed are completely at variance with the African traditions of the known past. As I told you above, genocide is completely un-African. Yet we have witnessed several phenomena of this ugly practice. They invented a completely obscurantist ideology in, for instance, the Great Lakes region. Some of the highly integrated, specialized and civilized societies of the Great Lakes region are now the epitome of disaster and disintegration thanks to this obscurantism. We have now witnessed incredible bloodletting in Rwanda and Burundi because of "ethnic" differences. What are these ethnic groups and how are they different from each other?

The Social Structure in the Great Lakes Region:
(The Ankole Example)

Instead of talking about Rwanda and Burundi, let me talk about Ankole (Western Uganda) which had a similar social structure. What they call "ethnic" groups are in fact more akin to occupational guilds based on job specialization: agriculturists, cattle-keepers and rulers in the case of Ankole; and in the case of Rwanda-Burundi do not forget to add a fourth group – the hunter-gatherer – the Batwa (Pygmy-like). In Ankole, there were the Bahima (cattle-keepers), the Bairu (cultivators) and the Bahinda (rulers). If a Muhima lost cattle, he would become a Murasi and eventually, become a Mwiru; if a Mwiru acquired cattle, he would become a Mwambari and, eventually, become a Muhima. The society was, therefore, cyclic, around the principle of job specialization and the ideology that went with it. This was at the level of the commoners. Of course, the commoners could be absorbed in the ruling caste also. In fact the mother of Ruhinda, the founder of Bahinda dynasty, Njunaki, was a Muzaana (a female slave) possibly captured from neighbouring tribes. Since the Banyankore are patrilineal, all her offspring became members of the Bahinda caste. None of the other two castes, however, would ever become a Muhinda. Bahinda were the rulers and they monopolized political power. The Bahinda did recruit warlords from among the Bahima and Bairu depending on the talents of individuals. Ultimate power, however, resided in the Bahinda. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the Bahinda are a new dynasty going back for only 36 generations, starting around 1500. Yet the society itself is very old. What, then, were the characteristic relations in such a society? Were they parasitic relations or were they symbiotic relations?

To answer whether the relations among the Banyankore society were symbiotic or parasitic, apart from the knowledge of history in our possession, we need to go to language and capture the words that characterized the exchange of goods and services between the specialized groups and within them. The cattle-keepers' exchange of products with the cultivators was called okuchurika (barter-trade). This specifically meant exchange of foodstuffs (especially millet and bananas for cattle-keepers did not eat most of the other goods) and perfumeries (ebibaya, orweju, etc.) If it were other items like pottery (engyemeko, rukome, enyabya, ebichuba, etc.), milk-pots (ebyanzi, enkongooro), wooden watering buckets (amachuba), wooden bowls (entatika), iron items (amachumu, emihoro, empango, ruraara, orumwaiso, enyerere, etc.), or copper items (emiringa), another word would be used - okubunzya (hawking). Okubunzya would result in okugura (purchase). If it was beer, whether of bananas (amaarwa or rwaagwa) or millet/sorghum (omulamba), the term of exchange was okushengyeera. If beer was not sold but just given in form of a party, it was called okutereka. If, on the other hand, beer or other food items were sent as gifts, it was called okuzinduka. If, on the other hand, meat was sent as a gift, it was called okutsiira. All these and more were terms of exchange or gifts among equals within the specialized groups or between them. All these words conclusively prove that, between the common Bahima and common Bairu (i.e. those not elevated by the rulers to position of warlords), the relations were symbiotic without any doubt. While the relations in exchange of goods and services were completely symbiotic and on equal basis, there would, sometimes, be mutual deprecations between these two groups in terms of attitudes. This, however, did not affect the equality of the two in terms of exchange.

Our rich language, determined not to leave any shadow of doubt, provides completely different words for exchange between the commoners (Bahima/Bairu) and the rulers (Bahinda/Bashambo or the commoners they elevated to position of warlords). The categories of rulers were precisely described by our language: Omugabe (the king); Enganzi (Prime Minister); Omukuru w'omutwe (regimental/commander); Omwinginya/Omurangira (prince); Omwigarire (queen); Rubuga (official sister and co-ruler); Omumbaija (any other sister of the king); Nyamashore (the queen-mother) etc. The terms of exchange between the commoners and any of these categories were very different from those applying among commoners. Here, one begins hearing of Okutoija (pay tribute). Tribute itself is called emitoijo. It is clear that there is no exchange here. The recipient may or may not reciprocate. If he reciprocates, it would be called okugaba (donate). The king may okunyaga (confiscate) a commoner's property because he is not happy with him. He may also kunogora the cattle of the commoner (partial confiscation). He may also kutangisa (to fine) etc. The relations between the ruled and the rulers were clearly parasitic or, at least, hegemonic.

Therefore, any progressive force seeking reform would have noted the symbiotic relations with satisfaction and would have concentrated on eliminating the parasitic relations: okunyaga, okunogora and okutoija. However, you all have been hearing that there are conflicts between the cattle-keepers and the cultivators in the Great Lakes Areas: Bairu-Bahima, Bahutu-Batutsi, etc. Where these conflicts are, it is not in search of social justice; but as a consequence of a colonial manipulation and ideological bankruptcy by the local political elite. If you look into the past, any progressive polarization of social interests, where parasitic relations still persisted, would have seen the common Bahima and common Bairu forming a common front to resist the parasitism of Bahinda/Bashambo and the commoners they would have elevated to state positions (Enganzi, warlords etc.).

All this, however, was before colonization. With the onset of colonialism, completely new relations came into force. In Ankole the British introduced Nvuma laws (inviolability of property rights) in 1905 in order to punish the Ankole chiefs for killing Galt, the British PC for Western Province. In Rwanda, the obuhakye (clientship) was abolished in the late colonial period by Mwami Rudahigwa. The Buhakye was also abolished in Burundi. The money economy was introduced and selling and buying became the main forms of exchange. People took up paid employment. The main problem remained underdevelopment of the economies as a whole. In particular limited employment opportunities.

However, the colonialists introduced a new imbalance: manning the colonial administration at the low levels. Here, following false genetic and cultural arguments, they would decide to use elements (very limited in numbers) from one of the specialized groups in running the colonial administration. They would, for instance, say that the Tutsi in Rwanda or the Baganda in Uganda are "naturally clever" and, therefore, are good for administration. They would, then, say that the Acholis, the Kurias, the Kambas or the Bangala are "brave naturally" and they should dominate the Army or Police. Of course, the numbers involved were very small. By the 1950s, the Ankole area had a population of 5,000,000 persons and it had about 275 senior and minor chiefs. Even if one assumed that all of them were from one "ethnic" group, how would such a category of people bring marked advantages to the "ethnic" group? The salary of the

minor chiefs would be about Shs. 80 (about $10 at that time). When you hear the reactionary politicians creating such havoc in search of "balancing", they are seeking to balance such miserable figures. After independence, of course, the number of state employees increased. The Public Service of Uganda today (army, civil service, teaching service, etc.) is only 300,000. Uganda, currently with a population of 20 million, will all the same not have its employment problems solved by such miserable figures.

Uganda has now been independent for more than 36 years. During 22 of those years, our country was led by elements from the North of Uganda who proceeded to fill the army, the police, the intelligence services, etc., with personnel from that part of the country. Recently, I asked opinion leaders from that part of our country to show me the "development results" of that "domination" of these services by elements from the North. There were none. Whatever signs of development that there were, were a consequence of private investment by the locals, many of whom have never worked for the Government.

Key issues in Conflict Resolution:

Therefore, when we talk of conflict resolution, we must address four issues:

(a) Ideology as opposed to obscurantism and criminal opportunism;

(b) The strategic goals of our countries in development terms;

(c) Empowerment of the people to ensure inclusion; and

(d) Mechanisms of handling conflicts where they arise.

First, we must reject the sectarian ideology of reactionaries, which, as we have seen above, is based on false history and foreign manipulation. We should only work with people who believe in Burundi, in Rwanda, in Uganda and in Africa and not with those who believe in sectarianism. The latter must be isolated and suppressed. Sectarianism is nothing but criminal opportunism, seeking cheap popularity and utilizing dangerous techniques.

Secondly, it will be easier to suppress the reactionaries if we are clear about the long-term goals (strategic) of our countries. Will our countries remain backward, pre-industrial societies based on primitive agriculture, exporting a few raw materials with a preponderant import-orientation? With such underdevelopment, we shall have plenty of opportunity to fight over "balancing" of jobs in the bureaucracy; even that will cause the absorption of a small number of people. If, on the other hand, we do not accept this, then we shall have to take the road that has saved the countries of Europe from stagnation and deprivation. By 1810, the population of U.K. was only 10 million people. A man, by the name of Alfred Malthus, was so alarmed that, mourning the disappearance of plagues and pestilences that had kept the population low in previous millennia, he warned that unless people engaged in abstinence, the population which was growing "geometrically" could not keep pace with food production which was only growing "arithmetically". The population of U.K. is

now, not 10 but 56 million and it is more opulent than ever before. What made the difference?

Industrialization. This is the way forward for our countries. Holland has only got a land area of 41,000 sq kms but with a population of 16 million people with a lot of affluence. Rwanda and Burundi are actually bigger than Holland in land area by an area of 10,000 sq kms with less population. Many of them are, however, living in poverty. With industrialization, many of the labour force will get jobs provided we equip them with skills.

Thirdly, to avoid conflict, we must ensure that the people achieve sovereignty in their respective countries and that there is inclusion in the political process. Although I have said that employment in the public service is not important, inclusion in the political process is very vital. Every major group should feel represented in Government. Inclusion in the political process means recognition of people's rights. Human beings do not only need food. "Man does not live by bread alone", said Jesus. Man needs spirituality, needs dignity. Moreover, participating in the political process enables one to influence decisions about development strategies. There must, therefore, be fair, transparent and democratic practices in the whole of Africa. Although we had elections in 1962 in Uganda, they were massively rigged in spite of the presence of the British. Constituencies were gerrymandered; instead of using a single ballot box and a single ballot paper, each political party would have its own ballot box, enabling the Uganda Peoples' Congress party of Obote to pour acid in the box of the Democratic Party; or switch labels from a full box to an empty one; or somebody could stuff additional illegal papers into a favoured ballot box; the counting would not be done immediately after polling and the boxes would be transferred all the way to district headquarters, thereby allowing for the tampering with the votes, etc. The whole process was completely discredited.

By 1966, even this non-transparent process was "abrogated" by Obote. We were supposed to have had the next elections by 1967. The elections were postponed because of the "exceptional" situation in the country, etc. As a consequence, the people of Uganda never saw the inside of a polling booth for another 18 years (1962-1980). In 1980, instead of learning from the mistakes of 1966, Obote wove new schemes. Obote and Muwanga refused to amend the Electoral Law. The non-transparency and the unfairness of 1962 were resurrected and we were back to square one. How could conflict be avoided in this case?

Finally, there should be mechanisms of conflict resolution in each country and in the region. Within each country a culture of sharing in the security fields by all nationals of the country so that the security organs are trusted by everybody; and, where necessary, sharing in the power. In Uganda, we stopped the colonial practice of recruiting army only from certain areas. We gave each district, not each ethnic group, a quota to fill in recruiting into the army. The Army, which used to be perceived as sectarian, is now perceived as national. Besides, since 1986, we have been operating a broad-based administration in politics.

As a consequence, although Uganda's problems are not eliminated, we have been able to sustain an average rate of growth of GDP of 6 per cent for the last

11 years. Uganda would have performed even better if we had a better regional security framework. We have been able to repair important aspects of our economy and social programmes in spite of the insecurity that has been endemic on our borders with the Sudan, Rwanda, Congo and Kenya at different times in the last 12 years. There should be a regional pact, not to allow insecurity to emanate from any of our countries in order to affect the neighbours. Additionally, there should be a regional arrangement to prevent the usurpation of the sovereignty of the people of East and Central Africa by despotic regimes. If, for instance, Obote had been prevented from overthrowing the 1966 Constitution or Amin's coup had been suppressed in 1971, Ugandans would have been saved a lot of haemorrhage and the economy would have been saved.

Having seen the four factors above, necessary for conflict resolution in most situations, we should know that for the Great Lakes region there are additional factors. You cannot talk of resolving conflicts in the Great Lakes areas i.e. especially in Rwanda and Burundi without talking of impunity. The first massacres took place in 1959 under the supervision of the Belgians. The international community did nothing about this. The Hutu reactionaries, therefore, came to believe that genocide could pay. On the other hand, the reactionaries in Burundi, after the nationalist movement's leadership had been decapitated through the assassinations of Rwagasore and Ngendanduumwe, the Tutsi came to believe that in order to survive Rwanda-type genocide they would have to pre-empt Hutu schemes of genocide with their own genocide. It is this permutation of criminal mishandling that has resulted in the subsequent conflicts and catastrophes in Rwanda and Burundi. Therefore, to bring this conflict to an end, anybody guilty of genocide, especially in the role of an author of genocide, must be punished by hanging.

Those who say that they no longer believe in capital punishment must not forget that the crimes committed were capital compounded. This is one area where the Law of Moses would help us: "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth". If the United Nations does not do this, the Rwanda and Burundi Governments do not do it, then the families of the victims will have their own revenge. We are, therefore, talking of disciplined punishment as opposed to anarchical punishment; punishment, however, must be there. As far as the majority of the people who were used in the genocide are concerned, other ranges of punishments must be thought about. I am tempted to recollect the traditional blood settlement in Ankole known as okukaraba which involved both paying a heavy fine of cattle and a religious ceremony to cleanse this crime.

In resolving this conflict, we must remember to rely on credible people that have not tainted themselves in the murky history of the respective countries. Our experience showed that to try to rely on a tainted person to solve such controversial problems is to indefinitely postpor the solution.

May I end by reiterating that it is incorrect to lump all conflicts together. Some conflicts are justified and principled while others are unjustified and unprincipled. As far as principled conflicts are concerned I can think of two situations:

(a) Defranchised majority, having exhausted all peaceful means, being forced to take up arms as a means of last resort;

(b) A minority group being threatened with extermination by any force whether majority or otherwise. Such a group has got every right to defend itself even by force of arms in order to ensure survival.

May I recapitulate by saying that the conflicts in the pre-colonial times were in the form of raids for cattle and women; succession wars where there was no mechanism for a smooth process; conflicts resulting from migrations of peoples; conflicts caused by the slave trade or the initial encroachment of Europeans; and, later on, wars of resistance to colonialism. Towards the end of the colonial era, there were wars of national liberation; conflicts resulting from colonial manipulations, as in Rwanda and Burundi; and anti-dictatorship wars as in Uganda, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, etc.

The current crisis of the Great Lakes region:

At the very beginning of this presentation you remember that I cited four factors that are at the heart of the Great Lakes region's crisis. These are: the genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern Congo; the extrajudicial mass murders in Uganda started by Idi Amin and continued subsequently; terrorism sponsored by the Islamic regime of the Sudan which has now linked up with genociders and the mass murderers; and absence of democratic governance and state structures to guarantee such governance (e.g. army, judiciary, etc.).

In the subsequent narration, centred on our involvement of the last 30 years, you will see how the four factors I have outlined above have interacted with one another to produce the Great lakes region's crisis as it is known today.

Since 1971, FRELIMO of Mozambique had been helping us in fighting Idi Amin through the clandestine recruitment of young boys; we took them to either Tanzania or the liberated areas of Mozambique for training.

Between 1976 and 1978, I, as a member of FRONASA (the Front for National Salvation of Uganda), was responsible for preparing one of such batches of trainees at Montepuez in Mozambique. In the process of gathering that particular group in Nairobi, three young boys were sent to me from Uganda by one of my comrades, Kahinda Otafiire. One of the young boys, Fred Rwigyema (R.I.P.) alias Gisa was, as it turned out, a Rwandese refugee whose family had been in Uganda since 1959, being part of the diaspora that had been generated by the first Belgian genocide in Rwanda in 1959.

This particular group that I trained in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, comprised twenty-eight fighters. Needless to state our eternal gratitude to FRELIMO and late President Samora Machel.

The Montepuez group helped me in creating a force of 9,000 fighters (by April 1979) that took part alongside our Tanzanian brothers (who put in a force of 45,000 officers and men) in expelling Idi Amin and his criminal army from Uganda.

After the ousting of Amin, Uganda had an interim period of two years of political confusion and, eventually, the rigged elections of 1980. We, as

revolutionaries, could not accept another round of rigging elections. This had been the failure of the constitutional dispensation of the 1960s. We launched our second war of liberation, this time on our own without external support being primary; different from the first anti-Amin war.

Starting with 27 rifles, we eventually built up a force of 20,000 rifles, mainly captured from our opponents in the Obote regime. We, however, got a modest contribution of 900 rifles from President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Towards the end of 1985, we got a sizeable contribution of 5,000 rifles from Mwalimu Nyerere, just before he retired. We had repaired our earlier misunderstandings with Mwalimu by this time.

By January 1986, the National Resistance Movement took control of State power in Uganda. In the 16 years since the seizure of power by Idi Amin in 1971, 800,000 Ugandans had died in extrajudicial murders.

By absorbing the myriad of security forces of the previous armies, militiamen plus fresh recruitment, we built our force to 100,000 officers and men in order to try to cope with the unstable situation in our area (Sudan, Mobutu's Congo, and others).

In our new army, in addition to Fred Rwigyema, the young Rwandese boy of 1976 (by that time a Major General in our Army), there were about 4,000 other officers and men of Rwandese origin - either part of the diaspora of 1959 or earlier immigrants that had started coming to Uganda since 1910, mainly due to harsh Belgian rule or simply in search of economic opportunities. In addition to Rwandese of the diaspora and the Rwandese of Rwandese culture that had been incorporated in Uganda, as there were Rwandese of Ugandan culture (Nkole-Kiga), that had been put in Rwanda by the colonial boundaries. However, the Ugandans of Rwandese culture did not participate in the fighting that developed in Rwanda, later. Four thousand soldiers of Rwandese origin in the National Resistance Army of Uganda started organizing under Fred Rwigyema. They told me of their intention to regain their rights in Rwanda, which had been nullified ever since the 1959 genocide. I rendered some modest financial assistance to these Rwandese soldiers but on condition that they exhausted political and diplomatic channels such as: petitioning the United Nations Organization, the Organization of African Unity, the neighbouring countries and others, before resorting to a military struggle.

In October 1990, however, these Rwandese soldiers, without prior consultation, escaped en masse and invaded Rwanda while I was here in the United States of America, attending the United Nations Conference on the Year of the Child. I immediately contacted the late president Habyarimana of Rwanda and offered to assist him in restoring peace in Rwanda, provided he also agreed to have a dialogue with the Rwandese in the diaspora leading to a national agreement to eliminate the consequences of the genocide of 1959.

Numerous efforts were made to realize a dialogue between late President Habyarimana and the Rwandese in the diaspora in Mwanza, Arusha, Kyanika and others but there was no political will to conclude this problem. The war continued. Faced with this fait accompli situation by our Rwandese brothers,

who had invaded Rwanda without consultation, Uganda decided on a two-course action.

1. To help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) materially, so that they are not defeated because that would have been detrimental to the people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda's stability.

2. To encourage the dialogue between President Habyarimana and the Rwandese in the diaspora.

Unfortunately, the agreement, even when it was signed in Arusha, was not implemented. The fighting went on until the demise of President Habyarimana, the collapse of the Habyarimana Government and the genocide of about 1 million people.

After the defeat of the extremist reactionaries, about 1 million Rwandese refugees fled to Goma in Zaire (now Congo). Along with them, went the whole former army of Rwanda (FAR) and the criminal Hutu militias that had killed people in Rwanda known as the Interahamwe. The late President Mobutu Ssese Sseko decided to keep these criminals right at the border, contrary to the United Nations regulations, thereby posing a permanent danger to the population of Rwanda. Uganda and Rwanda called for the separation of armed elements from the non-combatants, to no avail. This set the stage for events that I will narrate later involving Congo-Kinshasa, then Zaire.

However, let me go back a bit to recollect my interaction with H.E. Laurent Kabila. Soon after our victory of 1986, Mr. Kabila came to see me in Entebbe. This was the first time for me to meet him. He was coming out of Tanzania where he had, apparently, lived. While in Tanzania, during the anti-Amin struggle, I had heard of Mr. Kabila, having some bases in the eastern mountains of Congo, around Kalemie, but I had never met him. He was introduced to me by the late Mwalimu J. Nyerere. Mr. Kabila wanted me to give him arms to fight Mobutu.

I told him that Uganda would not allow him to start operations on the Uganda-Congo border, given the prejudice that existed in the region against us having come to power through a protracted peoples' struggle. Some of the leaders thought that we were a bad example and that we would influence their own people. In any case, at that time, the late President Mobutu had not yet given us cause to want to fight him. It is true, he was mismanaging Congo but it was not our duty to solve internal problems of other countries. Besides, we did not want to intensify that prejudice against us by the older political leaders of Africa. I, therefore, just gave him a modest sum of money to help with political mobilization.

When, however, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) captured power in Kigali, in 1994, Mr. Kabila returned to Uganda. By this time, the Interahamwe menace had emerged on the Rwanda border with Congo. I, therefore, advised Mr. Kabila to work with the Rwandese because they had a sharper quarrel with President Mobutu than ourselves, the fact that Mobutu was by now in active collaboration with the Sudanese against us notwithstanding.

There was another Congolese who had contacts with me, by the name of Kissasse Ngandu (the late) whom I also referred to our Rwandese brothers. My aides forwarded both Mr. Kabila and Mr. Kissasse to the Rwandese Vice-President, Major General Kagame.

Apparently, Major General Kagame tasked the two brothers to recruit a force of Zairois (Congolese) to be trained by the Rwandese and be kept as a standby force to be used in case President Mobutu unleashed the Interahamwe criminals on the people of Rwanda for another round of genocide.

According to later information, Mr. Kabila and Mr. Kissasse did not succeed in raising the necessary manpower. When I later met Major General Kagame, he informed me of his frustrations. Then, an idea occurred to me. I had heard that 40,000 Masisi Tutsis of Congo's Kivu province had been hunted out of their ancestral land by the Interahamwe and President Mobutu's gangs and had taken refuge in Rwanda.

I, then, suggested to Major General Kagame to recruit a force of about 1,200 soldiers from among the Masisi people, train them and make them part of the Rwanda Patriotic army, in order to keep them as a standby force. Major General Kagame like the idea. In fact, thereafter, I forgot all about it but Vice-President Kagame went ahead and operationalized the idea.

Meanwhile, the stalemate of the Interahamwe criminals and the masses whom they had stampeded across the border persisted and grew worse. Having carried out the genocide against the innocent people in Rwanda, the Interahamwe now wanted to do the same in Kivu Province of Congo actively supported by Mobutu's administration. They had already uprooted the Masisi Tutsis as already pointed out. They now headed for another group known as the Banyamulenge, around Uvira. This must have been around August 1996 or thereabout. The next time I met Major General Kagame, he informed me that he had, actually, trained a group of 2,000 rather than the 1,200 we had talked about. He now sought my opinion regarding how they could be utilized in view of all the chaos in the Great Lakes region.

I then suggested to Vice-President Kagame that it would be better for us to contact Mwalimu Nyerere (R.I.P.) on the issue in order to avoid the isolation we had experienced from the other African countries during the Rwandese conflict. Vice-President Kagame concurred with me and I, accordingly, contacted the late Mwalimu Nyerere and briefed him about the force of 2,000 and the threat to the Banyamulenge. He informed me that he would invite the European Union ambassadors to enlist their support. He duly called them but, of course, they must have filed reports to their headquarters and that was that, since the danger of genocide to the Banyamulenge persisted. It was at that stage, that the Rwandese brothers decided to send in the force of 2,000 to defend the Banyamulenge and, later on, help in dismantling the camps of the criminals in the Bukavu and Goma areas. Apparently, they recruited another 2,000 fighters from among the Banyamulenge Tutsis, other Congolese of Rwandese culture and other Congolese tribes. The Rwandese can tell the story better at this stage.

However, according to what the Rwandese told me, it is this force of 4,000 that defended the hills of Mulenge, liberated Uvira, Bukavu and Goma. As these towns were falling, the Rwandese informed me that they had now brought four

groups of Congolese together: the 4,000 or so Congolese fighters of Rwandese culture, Mr. Kabila, Mr. Kissasse and another gentleman of the Bashi tribe known as Masasu (in prison). This is how the word "Alliance" came to be used in designating their organization; it was the "Alliance" of the four or so groups. At this stage, through fraternal contacts, a number of African countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zambia and uganda gave material support. Angola, even contributed troops, and Tanzania later gave the "Alliance" training personnel.

Congo having been a hunting ground for profits for so many external interests, there was intensive pressure to influence events as the struggle proceeded. We tried our best to galvanize African opinion. I remember in the early days of that conflict I briefed Their Excellencies: Mandela, Mugabe and Chissano in South Africa about this Congo situation which they had not known much about. Progressive African opinion was galvanized. In particular, I knew that the position of H.E. Mandela was very important. The major danger to Congolese liberation, ever since the days of Lumumba, had been external anti-democratic involvement.

In recent times, some European circles had assumed the vanguard role of frustrating the peoples' aspirations. It was clear to me that there were only four deterrents to such Europeans' negative involvement:

(a) They feared a protracted peoples' struggle, Viet Nam style, if the Congolese could organize it; the Congolese had, however, failed once before in the 1964-1966 Congo war in spite of considerable solidarity from Africa and the Communist bloc;

(b) They would be cautious of American wishes - in this case the Americans wanted Mobutu to go but they did not favour Mr. Kabila; they wanted a third force;

(c) To some extent they feared the manifest unpopularity of Mobutu. However, the popularity, or otherwise, of Mobutu's regime had never been a major factor in Congo ever since the days of Lumumba; Lumumba had been the most popular politician but he had been deposed and, then, killed with impunity; and

(d) These external forces feared going against South Africa because of the rather hi-tech weapons that South Africa commanded; these European circles knew that if African freedom fighters got those weapons, and progressive Africa was unanimous, the battlefield would be levelled unlike in the past when it was never level.

I shared all these views with the comrades that were involved including H.E. Kabila and H.E. Kagame. I was, therefore, most surprised when H.E. Kabila refused to go to H.E. Mandela's ship in the Atlantic, citing security reasons. This worried me and I invited him to Uganda. We had discussions for hours on this one subject and, then, parted. To my amazement, he refused to return the second time.

Fortunately, for the struggle, events were moving fast. After the Banyamulenge had captured Goma, Bukavu and Uvira, assisted by troops of the

Rwandan Army, a massive recruitment of fighters from other Congolese tribes started. As the training proceeded, the fighting continued, being executed, mainly, by the Rwandan Army, the Banyamulenge and commanded by a young officer, by the name of James Kabareebe of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA). Apparently, that young officer had been recruited and trained in Uganda by the Tanzania training team that had been assisting us in Jinja. As time went on, more and more Congolese fighters from tribes other than the Banyamulenge joined the fight after the training. I was, however, worried about the direct involvement of the Rwandese troops in the combat role. I preferred that they only remain in a training role. In fact at one point, I almost succeeded in getting H.E. Kagame to withdraw them. However, H.E. Kabila resisted this; a move I did not like because, even in our own experience in 1978/79, I did not support the involvement of Tanzanian troops in the combat role in Uganda beyond the retaliation against Amin's invasion of the Kagera salient. I had wanted us to fight for ourselves. When we supported RPF, we never allowed our troops to play a direct combat role except in limited retaliatory strikes against Habyarimana's army for indiscriminate shelling of civilian hamlets and villages. This has always been our position on the Sudan except in March-April 1997, when we were forced to take decisive action against the Sudanese Army because of the criminal terrorist attacks on civilians in Northern Uganda, West Nile and also Rwenzori mountains going through Mobutu's Congo. We also destroyed the Sudanese Army in Western Equatoria because they were directly threatening the Rwandese troops in Congo and the Congolese freedom fighters from their bases in Kaaya, Baazi, Morobo and others. Again, this was limited; not aimed at installing Dr. Garang in power, in the Sudan.

I feared two situations in using outside troops, even the fraternal ones:

(a) It artificially distorts the outcome of the conflicts; one gets artificial "winners" and "losers"; the political problems, therefore, remain unresolved because the "winners" "win" artificially and the "losers", "lose" artificially. This could, however, be compensated for, if the artificial "winners" brought in all the legitimate, political forces so that they all plan for the future, together. If, however, one combines a scenario of "artificial winners" and political exclusion, one is setting a stage for future political problems. Furthermore, since somebody is relying on external support primarily, he neglects internal, political integration. He neglects making the necessary compromise internally because he is relying on external support to muffle internal fissures.

(b) The internal liberation forces do not build capacity. However, my opinion was not accepted, especially by H.E. Kabila. Incidentally, this used to be one of the differences between Obote and myself during the anti-Amin struggle.

Furthermore, from the little I could gather, the lack of structures and lack of broad representation in the "Alliance" was worrying. Since this was quite a big war involving regional troops, I was of the opinion that a national conference of all anti-Mobutu political forces should have been organized into an ultimate body that would select the future Government of Congo instead of leaving it to the "Alliance", whose internal mechanisms of decision-making were not known to us. My fear was that any future complications in Congo would be

blamed on the regional leaders that, without doubt, decisively and quickly, tilted the balance of forces in favour of H.E. Kabila and the "Alliance".

Therefore, just before the fall of Kinshasa, I suggested the idea of holding a national conference of all anti-Mobutu political forces, to H.E. Bizimungu, H.E. Mkapa, Mwalimu Nyerere and H.E. Kagame. The majority of them, however, thought it was a "bit late" and that we should remain "close" to H.E. Kabila "advising" him and so on. I was, however, not interested in the role of "adviser" to H.E. Kabila because the few times I had tried to "advise" him, he appeared to resent my advice. He only "advised" me to get involved in the internal affairs of Congo, on his side when I preferred not to be; but he resented the "few pieces of advice" that I proffered to him as "interference in his internal affairs".

From that time, Uganda's only involvement in Congo was to send a police training team following the decision of the Harare Breakfast Group, to train the Congolese in riot control.

It did not take long for my fears to be borne out. The victory against Mobutu by the Rwandese and the Congolese they had mobilized was realized by May 1997. However, by 1998, murmurings had started coming out of Congo that Kabila was no different from Mobutu. I shared my fears with the African leaders I met in a seminar in Namibia in July 1998. However, by the 2nd of August, mutinies broke out all over Congo. The Congo crisis had broken out afresh.

Our original reasons for supporting Kabila against Mobutu had never been addressed: the genocidal Interahamwe, the terrorists supported by Sudan through Congo and the threat of genocide to certain sections of the Congolese population in Eastern Congo. An accountable government in Congo would also be a factor for stability because unlike Mobutu's government, such a government would be answerable to the people. Therefore, such a government could not easily get involved in foreign adventures.

With this outbreak of new fighting in Kabila's own forces, given all the unresolved issues that closely and dangerously impinged on the security of our country and the neighbouring countries and communities, we decided to make precautionary deployments in Eastern Congo, so that the Sudanese do not use that area to create havoc in Uganda as they had done in November, 1996, when we defeated a large force sent by the Sudanese through Eastern Congo to capture the Kasese region of Uganda as a bridgehead for further Sudanese-Congolese invasion of Uganda. It did not take long before the Sudanese and "Amin" soldiers entered Northern Congo. Thanks to our presence, we defeated these forces. This denied the terrorists who had been infiltrated in the Rwenzori Mountains of Uganda fresh supplies. These terrorists had been committing untold atrocities against the population of Uganda as you can see from the file of newspaper cuttings that I have circulated to the esteemed members of the Security Council.

Apart from our own security interests, we cannot countenance again genocide in Rwanda, Burundi or Eastern Congo. This should, really, be the responsibility of the Security Council. However, when it comes to Africa, the United Nations never rises to the occasion. If the regional countries do not act where they can, irreversible tragedies will occur in our region again. This, we cannot

support. There are those who vulgarize the concept of sovereignty. To some circles sovereignty also includes the right to exterminate part of your people because they are "yours". People do not belong to leaders! They belong to their families, to their countries and to God. Any regime, which sets out to exterminate part of its people, loses legitimacy. I am a Ugandan, I, however, cooperated with Tanzanian troops to get rid of Idi Amin. You remember, at that time, there were those clamouring that by fighting the criminal regime of Idi Amin we were violating the "Sovereignty" of Uganda. How could Amin epitomize the sovereignty of Uganda? The sovereignty of Uganda had for long been usurped by the dictators to the detriment of the Ugandan people. By getting rid of Idi Amin, taking advantage of regional troops from Tanzania, the people of Uganda, eventually, regained their sovereignty.

Coming to the specific situation of Congo, therefore, there are four issues: disbanding the genocidal forces from Rwanda and Burundi; disbanding the terrorists supported by Sudan using Congo territory; stopping the genocide in Eastern Congo which had started; and, if possible, the emergence of an accountable government for Congo. I say, "if possible", because it is not our duty to democratize Congo. However, democratic neighbours always assist peace in the region.